Committing to the wrong artificial delegate in a collective-risk dilemma is better than directly committing mistakes

Terrucha, InesInesTerruchaDomingos, Elias FernandezElias FernandezDomingosSimoens, PieterPieterSimoensLenaerts, TomTomLenaerts2024-09-162024-06-092024-06-102024-09-1620242045-2322WOS:001215817800057https://imec-publications.be/handle/20.500.12860/44012Committing to the wrong artificial delegate in a collective-risk dilemma is better than directly committing mistakesJournal article10.1038/s41598-024-61153-9WOS:001215817800057COOPERATIONMACHINESMEDLINE:38714713